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Stevens’ forgotten crossroads:
the divergent measurement
traditions in the physical and
psychological sciences from
the mid-twentieth century
Joshua A. McGrane*
Pearson Psychometric Laboratory, Faculty of Education, The University of Western Australia, Perth, WA, Australia
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the consolidation in physics of
the three main traditions that predominate in discussions of measurement theory. These
are: (i) the systematic tradition pioneered by Maxwell (1873); (ii) the representational
tradition pioneered by Campbell (1920); and (iii) the operational tradition pioneered by
Bridgman (1927). These divergent approaches created uncertainty about the nature of
measurement in the physical sciences and provided Stevens (1946) with an opportunity
and rationale to, in effect, reinvent the definition of scientific measurement. Stevens
appropriated the representational and operational traditions as the sole basis for his
definition of measurement, excluding any place for the systematic approach. In com-
mitting to Stevens’ path, the psychological sciences were blinded to the advances made
in metrology, the establishment of the International System (SI) and the standard units
contained within this system. These advances were only possible due to the deep
conceptual and instrumental connections between the system of physical units and the
body of physical theory and laws developed over the preceding centuries. It is argued that
if the psychological sciences are to ever achieve equivalent methodological advances,
they must bridge this “metrological gap” created by Stevens’ measurement crossroads
and understand the ways in which the systematic approach advancedmeasurement. This
means that psychological measurement needs to be de-abstracted, rid of operational
rules for numerical assignment and set upon a foundation of quantitative theory, definition
and law. In the absence of such theoretical foundations, claims of measurement in the
psychological sciences remain a methodological chimera.
Keywords: measurement, metrology, S. S. Stevens, operationalism, representationalism, measurement systems,
psychometrics
Introduction
The late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, leading up to Stanley Smith Stevens’
measurement crossroads, saw the consolidation in physics of the three main theoretical approaches
to measurement that still predominate to varying extents in both the physical and psychological
sciences. These are the systematic, representational and operational approaches to measurement.
This discussion will address the body of writing of three of the major contributors of each of
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these approaches; Maxwell, Campbell, and Bridgman. It will out-
line how these approaches differ with respect to their defini-
tion of measurement, their demarcation of measurable and non-
measurable phenomena and their relation to the wider body of
scientific theory, definition and law. It will become clear that each
of these theorists, in fact, endorsed a systematic approach to mea-
surement in some form.However, Stevens selectively appropriated
aspects of the representationalist and operationalist approaches to
justify a liberalized definition of scientific measurement where a
systematic approach was excluded. The publication of this liber-
alized definition represents a crossroads where the development
of psychological measurement fundamentally diverged from, and
was blinded to, developments in metrology. The following his-
torical overview is intended to illuminate this crossroads and the
“metrological gap” it created.
The Systematic, Representationalist
and Operationalist Approaches
to Measurement
One of the modern forefathers of the systematic approach was
James Clerk Maxwell, one of the most influential physicists of
all time. Maxwell, in his seminal Treatise on Electricity and Mag-
netism, defined measurement as consisting of two essential fac-
tors, “One of these is the name of a certain known quantity of
the same kind as the quantity to be expressed, which is taken
as a standard of reference [i.e., the unit]. The other component
is the number of times [i.e., the ratio] the standard is to be
taken in order to make up the required quantity” (Maxwell, 1873,
p. 1). As a consequence, physical quantities are the subject matter
of measurement and a particular kind of quantity can only be
measured if there is a scientifically established unit to measure it
by. As Maxwell states, “there must be as many different units as
there are different kinds of quantities to be measured” (Maxwell,
1873, p. 1). His view would form the foundation of the standard
scientific definition of measurement and the establishment of an
international system of units (SI; de Boer, 1995).
Maxwell was a pioneer of a system of units built on the founda-
tion of what he referred to as fundamental units (now known as
base units); so called as they could not be expressed as relations
between or powers of other fundamental units. Non-fundamental
units, or what he referred to as derived units (also the contem-
porary terminology), were established by quantity equations that
specified relations between and powers of the fundamental units
on the basis of physical laws. Thus, the link betweenmeasurement
and the wider body of physical theory was fundamental and
explicit. This resulted in the systembeing invariant under different
national sets of measurement standards and meant that as science
progressed and new quantities were discovered, derived units for
measuring them could be easily reconciled with and integrated
into the system, or the system could be extended to include new
kinds of fundamental units.
Furthermore, Maxwell pioneered the movement away from the
use of standard objects as units, such as France’s meter bar, to
units defined in terms of the behaviors of microscopic molecules
that are invariant across objects, locations and time. “If…we wish
to obtain standards of length, time, and mass which shall be
absolutely permanent, we must seek them not in the dimensions,
or themotion, or themass of our planet, but in the wavelength, the
period of vibration, and the absolute mass of these imperishable
and unalterable and perfectly similar molecules” (Maxwell, 1870,
p. 421). This approach cleared the path for more accurate and
precise measurement by tying the systems of units to advances in
physical theory and scientific practices.
The most renowned and influential advocate of the represen-
tational approach around this era was the English physicist and
philosopher of science, Norman Campbell, who introduced his
highly influential ideas on measurement in Physics: The Elements
(Campbell, 1920). Although Campbell demonstrated knowledge
of Maxwell’s work (Campbell, 1921, p. 155), he was heavily influ-
enced by recent mathematical advances, particularly those of
Bertrand Russell, which lead him to define measurement more
liberally as “the assigning of numbers to represent properties” in
order to “enable the powerful weapon of mathematical analysis
to be applied to the subject matter of science” (Campbell, 1920,
pp. 267–268). In this context, Campbell intended “number” in
the mathematical sense, i.e., a member of the “real” number
line. Consequently, measurement was understood as a process of
discovering the relation between empirical properties and mathe-
matical objects so that numbers could bemeaningfully assigned to
represent the former, i.e., the empirical property could be treated
analogously as a mathematical object.
Campbell argued that the possibility of this representation was
dependent upon the experimental satisfaction of a number of
“rules” of measurement (Campbell, 1921). In essence, these rules
were intended to determine “the possibility or impossibility of
finding in connection with the properties a physical significance
for the [mathematical] process of addition” (Campbell, 1920, pp.
277–278). Fundamental measurement is possible for empirical
properties where the “rules of addition” may be “directly,” experi-
mentally examined, e.g., we can “directly” examine the measur-
ability of length by the relations between rigid rods and their
concatenation. Derived measurement, on the other hand, relies
upon the existence of what he termed “numerical laws” between
fundamental measures (Campbell, 1921). Although Campbell
explicitly acknowledged the relationship between scientific laws
and derived measurement, he also argued that these laws could
only be understood in a mathematical sense; e.g., a mass cannot
actually be divided into a number of volumes, “though that there
may be such a [numerical] relation has been suggested to us by the
study of the physical property [density]” (Campbell, 1921, p. 138).
Campbell goes on to make a distinction between “arbitrary”
and “true” measurement, and provides the assessment of Hard-
ness by Moh’s scale, and the assessment of temperature by the
Celsius thermometer, as examples of the former (Campbell, 1920).
The categorization of the Celsius measure of temperature as
“arbitrary” is particularly intriguing. Campbell argued that the
division of the Celsius scale into equal-interval units between
the fixed points (i.e., the freezing and boiling points of water)
was entirely arbitrary as it was “unconnected with any laws of
temperature [emphasis added]” (Campbell, 1920, p. 358). In more
general terms, he argued this distinction centered on whether
you have a true system of measurement, that is, one where the
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“numerical laws” define “true derived magnitudes” (Campbell,
1920, p. 360), which he describes as, “one of the most fruitful
sources of scientific progress” (Campbell, 1920, p. 361). In other
words, “true” measurement is only possible with a “true” system
ofmeasurement, wheremeasurement units are founded upon and
their relations reflect quantity-specific laws.
The Nobel Prize winning physicist Percy Bridgman introduced
operationalism as a broad philosophy of science in his clas-
sic book, The Logic of Modern Physics (Bridgman, 1927), but
was explicit that his earlier publication, Dimensional Analysis
(Bridgman, 1922), was a precursory application of his operational
theory (Bridgman, 1959). In this earlier publication, Bridgman
stated that, “for each different kind of quantity we have a different
rule of operation by which we measure it, that is, associate the
quantity with a number” (Bridgman, 1922, p. 17). This definition
of measurement is then elaborated with respect to “primary” and
“secondary” quantities, which are distinguished in the way that
the numbers are operationally associated with them. For primary
quantities, “certain rules of operation must be set up, establishing
the physical procedure by which it is possible to measure a length
in terms of a particular length…or in general…by which it is
possible tomeasure any primary quantity directly in terms of units
of its own kind” (Bridgman, 1922, p. 18).
Measurement of secondary quantities is performed by, “making
measurements of certain quantities of the first [primary] kind
associated with the quantity under consideration, and then com-
bining the measurements of the associated primary quantities
according to certain rules which give a number that is defined as
the measure of the secondary quantity in question” (Bridgman,
1922, p. 19). Moreover, these “certain rules” to define secondary
quantities must satisfy “…the same requirement that we [speci-
fied] for primary quantities, namely, that the ratio of the numbers
measuring any two concrete examples of a secondary quantity
shall be independent of the size of the fundamental units used
inmaking the required primarymeasurements” (Bridgman, 1922,
p. 19). In elaborating his definition of measurement, Bridgman is
describing a systematic approach to measurement in the vein of
Maxwell, albeit couched in operational terms.
This operationalist reinterpretation of Physics culminated in
his infamous operational principle that any “concept is syn-
onymous with a corresponding set of operations” (p. 5), which
Bridgman would later rue ever stating (Bridgman, 1959). This
principle led physicist Herbert Dingle to propose an even more
reductively operational definition of measurement as, “any pre-
cisely specified operation that yields a number” (Dingle, 1950,
p. 11).Whilst such a definition could be argued to be fairly benign
as a description of existing physical measurement, where “pre-
cisely specified operations” already involved the sorts of physical
laws and systems of units described as necessary for measurement
to varying extents in the approaches above, the same could not
be said for new disciplines attempting to establish a measure-
ment base. The primacy given to sets of operations meant that,
ultimately, the only restraint on claims of measurement for these
new disciplines was the imaginations of their scientists to invent
number yielding sets of operations.
The above overview provides a context to Stevens’ claim that
“measurement exists in a variety of forms” (Stevens, 1946, p. 677).
Around this era, some of the most prominent physicists were
inconsistent and at times unclear on what they took measurement
to be. Maxwell’s systematic approach reserved measurement for
physical quantities and ratios with their specific units, which were
integrated into a coherent system reflecting physical laws and
their quantity equations. Campbell’s representationalist approach
provided a somewhat more liberalized view of measurement
where numbers are assigned to empirical properties, thus remov-
ing the requirement for physical quantities and their ratios.
Although, “truemeasurement” involved a system ofmeasurement
not dissimilar to Maxwell’s, where numerical laws between fun-
damentally measured properties correctly specify derived mag-
nitudes/properties. Finally, Bridgman’s operationalist approach
definedmeasurement as an operational association between num-
ber and quantity. Whilst his explications of the operational rules
of association describe a systematic approach, the confounding
of concepts with operations led others to reduce measurement
to number yielding operations. Thus, it was not only profession-
ally convenient for Stevens to promote a liberal understanding
of measurement, but arguably scientifically defensible given the
leading thought of the day. However, his adoption of the more
liberal path excluded the common thread throughout Maxwell,
Campbell, and Bridgman’s writings, i.e., some level of systematic
understanding of measurement, and thus created a divergence
between the physical and psychological sciences that continues
today.
Stevens’ Crossroads and the Path Beyond
The origins of psychological measurement were intertwined with
a Physics tradition, which is unsurprising given that many of
the earliest quantitative psychologists were themselves researchers
in physical as well as psychological sciences, including Ernst
Weber, Wilhelm Wundt, and Gustav Fechner (Gescheider, 2013).
Early “psychophysical” research was explicitly concerned with
establishing empirical relations and laws between physical and
perceptual magnitudes and measuring the latter in units estab-
lished by just-noticeable-difference (JND) experiments. Whilst
such research was underpinned by questionable dualist assump-
tions and the dubious separation between JND “units” and their
physical counterparts (see McGregor, 1935; Michell, 1997), it
appears that the tradition shared commonalities with the sys-
tematic approach. The psychophysical approach to psychological
measurement spread to a range of different perceptual modalities,
and firstly entailed establishing a kind of perceptual quantity by
way of empirical relations and laws, and secondly establishing a
specific unit to measure that quantity. However, no attempt was
made to systematize these laws, their corresponding equations or
the units of perceptual magnitude.
In terms of Stevens’ contemporaries, Louis Thurstone, a major
originator of modern psychometrics, described measurement as
allocating an attribute of an object “to a point [i.e., a number] on an
abstract [linear] continuum…which requires some point at which
counting begins, called the origin, and some unit of measurement
in terms of which the counting is done” (Thurstone, 1931, p. 259).
Douglas McGregor, a colleague of Stevens at Harvard University,
defined measurement as, “the process of assigning numbers to
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 4313
McGrane Stevens’ forgotten crossroads
represent quantities” (McGregor, 1935, p. 249; which he adopted
fromCohen andNagel, 1934). In both of these definitions, one can
recognize the muddying of the measurement concept that hap-
pened in the twentieth century, and in particular, the influences
of the representationalist approach. However, parallels with the
physical understanding of scientificmeasurement remainwith the
requirement for quantity and/or units of measurement. Stevens
would liberalize measurement from either of these requirements.
Stevens was explicit about his influence by Campbell when re-
defining measurement “as the assignment of numerals to objects
or events according to rules” (Stevens, 1946, p. 677). He had an
intimate knowledge of Campbell’s work, as the latter played a
dominant role in the Ferguson Committee that was set up by the
British Association for the Advancement of Science to evaluate
claims of measurement by psychophysicists, including Stevens’
Sone scale of auditory sensation (Ferguson et al., 1940). However,
unlike Campbell, Stevens did not restrict the “rules” to those
that found an empirical link between physical and mathematical
properties by satisfying the criterion of additivity. Rather, he
introduced the now ubiquitous notion of “scales of measurement.”
Stevens explained that “scales are possible in the first place only
because there is a certain isomorphism between what we can do
with the aspects of objects and the properties of the numeral
series” (Stevens, 1946, p. 677). However, his inclusion of the
nominal and ordinal scales, or what he later ambivalently referred
to as “the weaker forms of measurement” (Stevens, 1958, p. 384),
liberated Campbell’s approach to the point where any consistently
followed rule that resulted in a numerical assignment could be
called measurement (Stevens, 1946).
But Campbell was not the only influence upon Stevens, as his
ultimate liberation of measurement was inspired by his interpre-
tation of Bridgman’s operationalism (Stevens, 1939). Specifically,
Stevens stated that “the type of scale [of measurement] achieved
depends upon the character of the empirical operations per-
formed…once selected, the operations determine that there will
eventuate one or another of the scales” (Stevens, 1946, p. 677).
So, the demarcation between “weak” and “strong” forms of mea-
surement is simply the researcher’s choice of operations. It is little
wonder that this definition has led to the proliferation of tens of
thousands of so called “measures” in the psychological sciences,
many of which are interpreted as analogous to the physical mea-
sures of the SI, despite the latter numbering less than 100, each
of which is underpinned by explicit physical theory and law. In
fact, Stevens seemed to take pride in this proliferation in a later
paper when he stated, “the variety of rules invented thus far for
the assignment of number has already grown enormous, and novel
means of measuring continue to emerge” (Stevens, 1968, p. 850).
Despite the dominance of Stevens’ definition in the psycho-
logical sciences (Michell, 1999), a number of mathematical psy-
chologists have acknowledged that his approach diverged too far
from the understanding of measurement in the physical sciences
(Krantz, 1972; Luce and Narens, 1987). Their proposed solution
reconciled Stevens’ scales of measurement with a more strictly
Campbell influenced, representational approach. So, like Camp-
bell and Stevens, measurement was taken to be the assignment of
numbers, but, this assignment depended upon the mapping of an
empirical, qualitative relational system on to the mathematical,
quantitative number system. Thus, unlike Stevens, the possi-
ble empirical mapping or “representation” determined the type
of measurement, but unlike Campbell, this mapping did not
exclusively depend upon the discovery of an empirical analog of
addition. The proponents of such an approach to measurement
developed it in to an extensive abstract theory of measurement,
which they referred to as the Foundations of Measurement (Krantz
et al., 1971).
This abstract theory has been held in high esteem by contem-
porary philosophers of measurement, yet it has had little practi-
cal influence outside of mathematical psychology and economic
utility theory (Cliff, 1992; Kyngdon, 2013). Stevens, ironically,
provided insight into its lack of influence in science when he
stated, “measurementmodels sometimes drift off into the vacuum
of abstraction and become decoupled from their concrete refer-
ence…A full theory of measurement cannot detach itself from
the empirical substrate that gives it meaning” (Stevens, 1968, p.
854). The irony of Stevens’ comment is that his own re-definition
broadenedmeasurement beyond any commitment to an empirical
substrate, i.e., an actual quantitative property that we attempt to
estimate, and relies on nothing more than a consistent choice of
empirical operations that may be constructed at the will of the
researcher (Luce, 1997). Nonetheless, his comment does strike at
a pertinent point regarding the abstract theory. In creating what
they believed to be a logical basis for measurement, the abstract
theorists’ mathematical account of measurement was grounded in
mathematical formalisms and axioms instead of empirical theory
and law (Berka, 1982).
By perpetuating the representationalist path forged by Camp-
bell, Stevens and their intellectual forebears, the abstract theo-
rists missed the advances that had been made by the developers
of the SI in the mathematical representation of measurement.
This representation was developed to be empirically grounded
in physical quantities, laws and the equations that express them.
The development of the SI has “indisputably [become] the basis
of all aspects of modern metrology” (Quinn and Kovalevsky,
2005, p. 2313), and in turn, all aspects of measurement in the
physical sciences. Over the course of the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries, this development has required the clarification of
conceptual confusions, the development of empirically-grounded
symbolic representations and the deepening of the interconnec-
tion between measurement and physical theory.
The Developments of the SI and Metrology
A thorough historical overview of the development is beyond
the scope of this paper (see Silsbee, 1962; Quinn, 2011, for
such a review), and thus I will concentrate on a number of key
developments that occurred around the time of Stevens’ cross-
roads and beyond. Briefly, as previously mentioned, Maxwell, in
collaboration with William Thomson under the auspices of the
British Association for the Advancement of Science, pioneered the
development of a coherent system of units, the centimeter-gram-
second (CGS) system. Under this system, a number of derived
units for the measurement of various mechanical and electro-
magnetic quantities are defined in terms of the base units for the
physical quantities, length, mass and time. The CGS system was
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superseded by the meter-kilogram-second (MKS) system in the
1940s, which evolved into the first SI in 1960.
Between 1948 and 1950 an additional base unit was added to
the MKS system, the Ampere, for the physical quantity, electrical
current (giving the MKSA system), and the quantity equations
for electromagnetic phenomena were changed to their “rational-
ized” form (Silsbee, 1962). Whilst the technical details of this
change are unimportant for the current paper, debates concern-
ing it highlighted a number of conceptual confusions inherent
in the metrology community, providing further evidence of the
evolving nature of the concept, which would result in a more
complete explication of the systematic approach as the basis of
the SI specifically, and scientific measurement more generally
(de Boer, 1995). These debates centered around two (fictitious)
camps, Realist and Systematist. The former were typically applied
scientists and engineers that routinely dealt with concrete (i.e.,
physically instantiated) quantities, concrete measurement units
and numbers from concrete measurement procedures. The latter
were typically more theoretical physicists who dealt with the
abstract quantities and units that were used in mathematical
statements of quantity equations (de Boer, 1995).
Similar to the abovementioned view of Campbell, the Realist
camp were inclined to interpret quantity equations as simply
numerical-value equations, thus ignoring the status of the quan-
tities in the equations. This view was influenced by the concrete
consideration that a quantity of one kind cannot literally be inter-
preted as being divided ormultiplied by a quantity of another kind
and nor can this product/quotient be realistically interpreted as
equivalent to a quantity of a third kind. Furthermore, there is even
doubt under this Realist view as to whether it is meaningful to
express a magnitude of a quantity as equivalent to the product of
a unit quantity of the same kind and a numerical value, as this is
not reflective of a concrete process of measurement.
In reply, the Systematist camp argued that the Realist camp
fundamentally misunderstood the symbolism of systems of mea-
surement, which led to the widespread push for the acceptance
of quantity calculus (QC) as a formal language to express the
quantity equations that underpin the system of units (de Boer,
1995). QC was first introduced by Maxwell and further devel-
oped by Wallot as a form of mathematical representation for
physical phenomena that gives primacy to physical quantities
and their relations, rather than numbers, as per ordinary algebra
(Humphry, 2011). Under this symbolism, abstract quantities are
always paired with their abstract units (abstract quantities of the
same kind), thus making explicit that anymathematical operation
is between numerical values obtained from the ratio of a quantity
and a unit. Themain rationale for the use ofQCwas that the quan-
tity equations (i.e., the mathematical expressions of physical laws)
remained invariant across choices of units. Moreover, QC was an
algebraically efficient, but still empirically grounded expression of
the more empirically complete statement of the proportionality of
ratios that quantity equations represent (Humphry, 2013b).
A concurrent development in the history of the SI was the
evolution of unit definitions, as per Maxwell’s aforementioned
vision, from concrete, material prototypes to theoretical expres-
sions of ontologically invariant physical phenomena. For example,
the unit of measurement for time is theoretically defined in terms
of the invariant frequency of radiation emission by a caesium
atom during a particular physical transition (Tal, 2014). This
definition is theoretical in the sense that the stipulated conditions
for the absolute invariance of this frequency are not empirically
realizable. Moreover, in the next iteration of the SI, the kilogram
prototype is to be discarded and replaced with a unit definition
based upon an application of the quantum-Hall and Josephson
effects, which ties it to the Planck constant, an ontologically invari-
ant physical relation (Quinn, 2011). Therefore, by the next SI,
the complete integration of the representational systems of units,
quantity equations and physical theory and law will be complete.
The abstract nature of the quantity equations and idealized defi-
nitions of units that underpin the systematic approach tomeasure-
ment raises the question of how these may be empirically realized
as concrete standards and measurement systems. This realization
is the primary task of applied metrology, or the Realist camp to
use de Boer’s (1995) nomenclature, and its epistemology has come
under increasing philosophical scrutiny in recent years (Mari,
2003; Tal, 2013). Whilst a thorough overview of this epistemology
goes beyond the scope of this paper, the realizations of primary,
secondary, etc., metrological standards are just as contingent
upon physical theory and laws as their abstract representations
within a systematic approach to measurement. Specifically the
metrologically realized standards serve as concrete instantiations
of physical theories and laws by approximately instrumentalizing
a standardized magnitude of a quantitative property or process
and providing the means to estimate the ratio of an unknown
magnitude of the same quantity to the standardized magnitude
(Quinn, 1997; Humphry, 2013a).
For example, the theoretical definition of the unit of time is
approximately physically realized in a primary standard known
as a caesium fountain clock, which is able to reproduce a specific
duration of time, the second, with an extremely high level of
precision by instantiating a cyclical physical process that draws
upon theoretical knowledge of atomic structure, radioactivity,
thermodynamics and gravitational force, amongst other numer-
ous quantitative and non-quantitative physical phenomena (Tal,
2014). Because the caesium fountain clocks are only stable for a
relatively short period of time, they are used to calibrate the stan-
dardized magnitude inherent in more stable secondary standards,
atomic clocks, which rely upon more experimentally controllable
electromagnetic effects. These atomic clocks provide the “ticks,”
i.e., one cycle of the physical process that instantiates the standard
duration, of Coordinated universal time that may be counted to
estimate the ratio of an unknown duration to the standardized
duration, i.e., measure the unknown magnitude of time. Whilst
the counting of these “ticks” may be thought of as simply a rule
to assign numbers to temporal duration on a ratio scale, that
would deeply trivialize the fundamentally theoretical nature of the
concrete and abstract measurement systems that underpin atomic
clocks and time measurement in general.
The Systematic Approach
and Psychological Measurement
As the systematic approach has come to predominate in phys-
ical scientific measurement, the psychological sciences have
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entrenched their separate path, complete with an array of athe-
oretical methodology, including (but certainly not limited to)
operational definitions, statistical distributions and mathematical
probability theory. In the physical sciences, the quantity status
of some physical properties [e.g., temperature (Sherry, 2011)]
was theoretically and empirically fought for over decades, if not
centuries. In contrast, the psychological sciences have adopted
practices where psychological quantities may be invented at the
will of the researcher and attention is then focused upon ever
more creative and technicalmeans to impose “real number”math-
ematics upon psychological attributes with little to no theoretical
justification for doing so. There can be little debate that the psy-
chological sciences severely lack substantive quantitative theory,
laws and equations, and that there are no scientifically established
measurement units, let alone an integrated, coherent system.
Moreover, there has been very little mainstream academic dialog
and debate about this absence, although a groundswell has been
building the past two decades (for examples see Michell, 1999;
Trendler, 2009; Humphry, 2011; Sherry, 2011; Kyngdon, 2013).
This is attributable in no short measure to Stevens’ redefinition
of measurement and the divergence with the physical tradition
that it did not create, but deeply entrenched into the discipline. As
Newman put it, since its inception, Stevens’ definition has “stood
like the Decalogue” (Newman, 1974, p. 137).
Despite the devout (and often implicit) following of so many
psychological researchers, the divergence of Stevens’ definition
has not gone entirely unnoticed within the psychological sciences
(Michell, 1997). Specifically, the abstract measurement theorists
discussed above have attempted to redress its effects. As Duncan
Luce put it, “No measurement theorist I know accepts Stevens’
broad definition of measurement…the only sensible meaning for
‘rule’ is empirically testable laws about the attribute [emphasis
added]” (Luce, 1997, p. 395). Whilst the above discussion is
critical of such theorists for their complete abstraction of their
measurement theory from any empirical grounding, the abstract
structures identified by these theorists may be helpful to psy-
chological researchers if re-grounded in empirical theory and
experimentation (Krantz, 1972; Kyngdon, 2013).
Until such theorizing and experimentation is done, and the
psychological sciences’ measurement agenda adopts a systematic
approach, any claims of measurement are premature and poten-
tially misleading if taken to be comparable to measurement prac-
tices in metrology. This is not a trivial point, as, for example, Item
Response Theorists regularly argue that their methods provide
“interval-level” measures of psychological attributes akin to the
measurement of temperature using a Celsius thermometer and
present their findings using spatial representations (e.g., Bond and
Fox, 2007), despite the glaring absence of any quantitative theory
or ontologically defined unit1 to justify such practices (Sherry,
2011). This claim of “interval-level” measurement is then used
as justification for making further quantitative interpretations
of test results, such as academic growth over time, which are
substantively unclear and potentially meaningless in the absence
of a clearly defined unit of measurement (Zwick, 1992). There
1Humphry (2013a) describes the unit inherent in IRT models, e.g., the “logit,”
as a “quasi-unit” because it is mathematically and not substantively defined.
may, however, also be examples where the application of a more
systematic approach bears little practical implication for current
practices in the psychological sciences (Briggs and Weeks, 2009;
Briggs, 2013). Clearly, further research is required to understand
and elaborate the implications of a systematic approach.
One such implication may be that no psychological quantities
and, therefore, no basis for a system of units are uncovered at
all, which would perhaps be unsurprising given the complexity
of psychological phenomena (Trendler, 2009). Given this, under
a systematic understanding, the psychological sciences could not
claim to measure anything (Michell, 2012). But, the prospect of
such a finding should not be viewed pessimistically as diminishing
the scientific status of the psychological sciences, as the physical
sciences are filled with non-quantitative properties and methods
(Sechrest and Sidani, 1995).
As an illustrative point, only a single unit of measurement has
been established outside of Physics, the Mole, which is used in
Chemistry to measure amount of chemical substance, and even
this has been a contentious addition given its interrelationship
with the continuous physical quantity, mass (Johansson, 2010;
Cooper and Humphry, 2012). Moreover, scientists of various
disciplines, including physics, chemistry, health science, clinical
laboratory sciences, biology, engineering, biochemistry, food sci-
ence, and molecular biology, which routinely deal with properties
of systems that are only amenable to nominal examination have
developed a vocabulary of nominal properties and examinations
(VIN; Nordin et al., 2010). This is intended to provide a common
and standardized language for scientific methods concerned with
non-quantitative properties and relations of natural systems [and
as a sister document to the International Vocabulary of Measure-
ment (VIM)]. All physical sciences routinely apply a range of
rigorous observational methodologies and their scientific validity
is determined by the nature of their subject matter, not by norma-
tively elevating onemethodology above all others (Hibberd, 2014).
This point was simply put by Johnson (1936, p. 351), “Those data
should be measured which can be measured; those which cannot
be measured should be treated otherwise.”
Some psychological researchers have begun to heed this mes-
sage by adapting complex network models from biological and
ecological sciences to investigate psychological phenomena with-
out any necessary assumption of underlying psychological quanti-
ties or measurement (Cramer et al., 2010; Borsboom and Cramer,
2013). Complex networks were created to scientifically model
natural systems that are inherently dynamic, non-linear and show
structural complexity (Strogatz, 2001); the kinds of properties
that seem likely of psychological systems. These models may
include both quantitative and non-quantitative elements, and as
a consequence, are amenable to measurements and other forms of
rigorous scientific observation. So whilst measurement substan-
tiated by quantitative theory and laws, and systems of quantity
equations and units may arguably remain a pipedream in the psy-
chological sciences, a more general systematic approach stresses
the fundamental nature of theory and observation to their scien-
tific progress. This does not necessitate redefining measurement
as rule-based numerical assignment, but rather a commitment
to rigorously investigate the ontological statuses of psycholog-
ical systems by methods that are theoretically and empirically
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substantiated (Barrett, 2003; Sherry, 2011; Maul, 2013; Hibberd,
2014).
Conclusion
Leading up to Stevens’ crossroads, three main approaches to mea-
surement were apparent which, at face value, diverged in their
definitions of measurement, their demarcation of measurable
phenomena and their emphasis of mathematical versus substan-
tive theory in claims of measurement. It has been argued in a
brief overview of the writings of three of the main initiators of
each of these approaches that such differences may have been
overstated, as each endorsed a systematic approach in some form.
Such a conclusion was contingent upon a broader reading both
within and across their body of work, rather than “reading”
each position in terms of a “single slogan taken out of the con-
text of the very paragraph in which it occurred” (Koch, 1992,
p. 261).
Nonetheless, each approach had key differences and these
differences provided a historical and conceptual precedence
for Stevens to present an entirely liberalized definition of
measurement. This definition created a significant divergence
between the methodological developments of the physical and
psychological sciences. The psychological sciences, for the most
part, embarked on a “measure” proliferation exercise at will and
seemingly ad infinitum, rather than scientifically examining the
nature of psychological phenomena and determining appropri-
ate methodology on that basis. Meanwhile, the physical sciences
clarified key conceptual confusions concerning measurement,
created a representational language that gives primacy to physical
quantities and quantitative relations rather than numbers, and
further entrenched the theory-measure nexus through the imple-
mentation of theoretical definitions of units. It has been argued
that if the psychological sciences’ measurement practices are to
gain similar scientific credibility, this metrological gap must be
spanned by the abandonment of Stevens’ liberal definition and the
adoption of a systematic approach to measurement. Quantitative
theory and laws, as well as the system of physical equations and
units that they determine, are the actual foundations of scientific
measurement. Whilst these foundations remain largely unconsid-
ered and unquestioned in the psychological sciences, claims of
measurement remain a methodological chimera.
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